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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we argue that the "received view" of replication äs the exact or
algorithmic repetition of an original study has become obsolete. Exact repe-
tition only appears to be a boundary case of a series of more or less "varied"
replications, that is, replications that systematically vary one or more param-
eters of the original study to see whether its outcome remains stable or
changes in a predictable way. Only in case of failure to produce any predicted
outcome through a series of varied replications does the suspicion of an
irreproducible effect arise, and therefore the need for a more or less exact
replication. From this "constructivistic" perspective it is to be expected that
exact replications are rather rare, although methodologically replicability is
considered to be one of the most important cornerstones of science. The
production of so-called "objective knowledge" (Popper, 1980) would be
dependent on the intersubjectivity of observations in accordance with the
hypothesis. Intersubjectivity of observations means that observational re-
ports would only be taken seriously if they could in principle be reproduced
by any competent researcher. A theory would only be considered falsified in
case of a replicable observation contradicting one of the implications of that
*This chapter was partly written during a stay at the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, Bethesda, MD, äs a senior Fulbright fellow. Preparation of this chapter was
supported in pari by the Netherlands Organization of Scientific Research (NWO) through a
Pioneer grant. The author would like to thank Michael Lamb for his constructive criticism on an
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theory (Popper, 1980). We argue here that the central idea of replicability
should not be interpreted literally, that is, äs the necessity of exact replica-
tions. Only if we take a more constructivistic perspective does it become
possible to notice replication studies being carried out äs pari and parcel of
everyday research. To emphasize its central role in methodology äs well äs in
research practice, we present a process model of replication in which dif-
ferent kinds of replication efforts are systematically interrelated. Against the
background of this process model of replication it becomes clear that re-
search programs allow for continuous replications of their data and results,
although isolated studies may remain unreplicated.
LACK OF EXACT REPLICATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT
1t seems äs if a tremendous lack of replication studies exists in the natural
sciences äs well äs in the behavioral and social sciences. A few examples may
illustrate this point for the behavioral and social sciences. The famous Harlow
(1958) experiments with primates raised by an "iron" mother or by a "cloth"
mother never have been exactly replicated, although their impact on the
theory of primary attachments in animals and in humans have been substan-
tial (Paul & Blumenthal, 1989). According to L.L. Ainsworth (1984) we even
should doubt the possibility of replicating the experiments because their
design has been described with too little detail. Maybe more influential still is
J.B. Watson's conditioning experiment with Little Albert. This experiment
showing the force of conditioning in human learning has never been repli-
cated, neither by Watson himself nor by his numerous students and followers.
Nevertheless there is some reason to believe that the experiment's exact
replicability should be doubted. Its design and procedures have been de-
scribed in a superficial way, and with sometimes contradicting details. Fur-
thermore, the experiment with Albert was preceded by many failures to show
that operant conditioning played a major role in human learning (Samelson,
1980).
Sometimes very influential studies are replicated after a long period of
time. Examples are: Burt's twin studies on the heredity of intelligence, Mead's
Samoa study focusing on the cultural context of adolescence (see Chapter 2),
and Efron's media-sociological study on the political biases in television news
about the candidates in an American presidential election campaign. On the
basis of a detailed and scrutinous (secondary) analysis of Burt's data set,
Kamin (197-;) concluded that Burt had at least partially faked his data and had
invented imaginary subjects and experimenters. Freeman (1983) showed that
Mead probably had not t«.ken into account all relevant and ävailable Infor-
mation, and had sketched a somewhat unidimensional and optimistic picture
of an idyllic tropical island. Stevenson and his colleagues (Stevenson, Eisin-
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ger, Feinberg, & Kotok, 1973) reanalyzed part of Efron's raw data after coding
these data with a more detailed and reliable coding System. They concluded
that Efron's theory could be falsified by her own data.
These replications seemed to disconfirm at least partially the original
studies, but they could not restrict their influence. On the contrary, the
replication studies provoked sometimes heated discussions about the merits
of replication (Holmes, 1983; Kloos, 1988), about the meaning and possibility
of "real" replications, and about their impact on scientific discourse (Collins,
1985).
It would seem, then, that replication studies do not seriously influence
discourse about the value of certain theories and their underlying data, and
that the request for more replications remained unanswered. Caplow (1982)
found that about 1% of the sociological studies is replicated. Shaver and
Norton (1980) observed that replications are nearly absent in educational
research: They found that only 14% of 151 research projects reported on in
the American Educational Research Journal could be considered replica-
tions. Bahr and his colleagues (Bahr, Caplow, & Chadwick, 1983) traced 300
replications (half of which are from psychology) in the Social Science Citation
Index over a period of almost 10 years (1973-1981), looking for the concept of
replication or its equivalents in the title of the papers. Studies that refer
explicitly to the concept of replication may be often considered exact repli-
cations. It seems, therefore, that only a small amount of behavioral and social
research is being exactly replicated, and that even very influential studies
remain unreplicated in the strict sense. Furthermore, if a study has been
replicated, and results diverge from the original outcome, more discussion
about the merits ot the replication and its author(s) seems to be provoked than
about the original study and the theory by which it was originaied. On the one
hand, replications are being considered the Cornerstones of modern science,
but on the other hand they seem to be carried out seldomly and they seem to
have little impact. How can this paradox be explained? We think that a naive
definition of replication äs exact repetition of a single original study is the
reason replications remain unnoticed.
REPLICATIONS IN THEORY: ALGORITHMIC REPLICATIONS
Many researchers think that studies can be replicated in an exact way
(Collins, 1985). These so-called exact or algorithmic replications would be
carried out strictly according to the technical rules of the original author(s); an
identical outcome should consequently be attained (Collins, 1975). From a
methodological perspective, however, such replications cannot exist, simply
because technical guidelines will always leave room for minor variations, and
because spatiotemporal parameters will have changed anyway (Musgrave,
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1975). Whether the same outcome will be produced will, therefore, depend
on the robustness of the original results in the presence of minor variations in
the research design, and of spatiotemporal variations. A replication will be
called an exact replication if it is essentially similar to the original study.
Every comparison, however, is being made from a certain perspective (Pop-
per, 1980, p. 421). As we have said, replications necessarily change the design
of the original study, but on the basis of available background knowledge it
will be assumed that the changing parameters will not have any influence on
the outcome. For example, in a replication of a study on the conditioning of
emotions, spatial parameters are being considered irrelevant; that is, the
conditioning study may be carried out in different parts of the world and is
nevertheless supposed to yield the same kind of results.
Our background knowledge, however, is not infallible, and can be consid-
ered "true" only for the time being (Popper, 1980). If the original study and its
replication show divergent results, differing parameters constitute possible
alternative hypotheses to Interpret the divergencies. With respect to cultural-
anthropological research, for example, Kloos (Chapter 2) composed a list of
important parameters: Replications usually are being carried out in another
social group, historically in another society, from a different cultural and
personal background of the researcher, and often also from a different
theoretical perspective. Differences between Mead's (1961) and Freeman's
(1983) study, for example, may be explained by the differences in social group
in which both researchers carried out their observations and interviewe,
differences in historical period (before and after the second World War), and
differences in theoretical perspective (cultural determinism versus sociobiol-
ogy). Last but not least, it certainly made a difference whether a woman or a
man carried out Interviews on sexual issues (Chapter 2).
If little knowledge about a certain domain exists, and if therefore our
background knowledge is still minimal, alternative hypotheses about the
causes or reasons for divergent replication results will be mushrooming. In
uncharted territory small differences in age of subjects, in apparatus, in
physical environment, in psychological atmosphere, and in the experiment-
er's personality may imply cumulative differences in outcome (Smith, 1970).
For example, research on attachment relationships between a caregiver and
an infant is usually based upon the Strange Situation procedure (Ainsworth,
Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). This procedure consists of a series of infant's
separations from and reunions with the caregiver in a stränge environment,
äs well äs a confrontation with an unknown person who tries to interact with
the infant. This procedure is often used in research on the effects of infant day
care and other practically relevant issues, but it is not clear to what extent
variations in playroom, play material, personality, and sex of experimenter
and "stranger," and the Order in which the procedure is carried out during a
measurement Session influence coding results. In the influential Bielefeld
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study (Grossmann & Grossmann, 1990), the large playroom with the life-sized
play material may be hypothesized to be one of the causes of the infants'
seemingly avoidant behavior to the parent when they enter the room after
being away for 3 minutes (Sagi, Van Uzendoorn, & Koren, 1989). It also has
been suggested that the overrepresentation of resistantly attached infants in
Israeli kibbutzim may partly be explained by the stressful sociability lest that
preceded the Strange Situation (Sagi et al., 1989). Because a strong back-
ground theory about essential ingredients of the Strange Situation is lacking,
many alternative hypotheses are possible in case of diverging attachment
classification distributions.
In sum, strictly seen it is impossible to copy an original study in the strict
sense of the word; necessarily some potentially relevant parameters will
inevitably change, and our background knowledge determines whether
these changes are essential or not. The strenger our background knowledge
is, that is, the more frequently confirmed or at least not falsified this knowl-
edge is, the more exact our replications may be considered to be. If back-
ground knowledge implies that spatiotemporal parameters are irrelevant in
producing a certain effect or outcome, the experiment can more easily be
replicated: In this case, we do not have to control for evasive spatiotemporal
variables, äs these variables cannot influence our evaluation of the identity of
the original and the replication study.
THE PRACTICE OF REPLICATION:
A CONSTRUCTTVISTIC VIEW
The constructivistic view on replication studies is based on sociological
research in scientific laboratories. Through participant observation in emi-
nent laboratories, and through in-depth interviewe with leading scientists, a
description of the practice of replication has been developed that contradicts
"received view^" of the replication process. Research on "gravitational radi-
ation" (Collins, 1975), on the construction of the "ETA laser" (Collins, 1985),
and on conditioning of "planarian worms" (Travis, 1981), for example, has
been the object of sociological studies. The results of these studies can be
summarized äs follows: First, interviewe show that exact replications do
occur only very infrequently in the natural sciences, and they constitute a
low-status activity (Mulkay, 1986). Researchers are much more inclined to
change some parameters of the original experiment systematically, so äs to
be able to discover new applications, and they are much less inclined to make
a "carbon copy" of the study. The outcome of the original study is accepted—
until the contrary has been proven. A falsification appears to be taken into
consideration only if an outcome repeatedly cannot be established, although
the variations on the original theme seem to be minor. Exact or algorithmic
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replications should be considered a boundary case of "varied" replication.
Starting with rather large variations of the design of an important study,
researchers first try to add something new to the original outcome, for
example by showing that the same effect can be produced in some other
species or with another chemical substance. If such larger variations do not
yield the expected results, more refined variations are being practiced, until
some doubt about the validity of the original study arises. In the end, "exact"
replication is applied to (dis-)confirm the doubts, and to check the assump-
tions of the varied replications. In sum, these social studies imply that many
scientists feel that exact replications may be carried out, but usually are
irrelevant for scientific progress.
Participant observations in laboratories also show that exact replications
are seldom carried out, and that every replication is subject to a negotiation
process on the relevance of changed parameters for diverging results (Collins,
1985). In other words, replications are not accepted without discussion about
the relevance of changed parameters for the production of (un-)expected
results. The so-called "enculturation model" is assumed to be a more ade-
quate description of replication than the algorithmic model. The encultura-
tion model emphasizes the process of socialization of the researchers who
implicitly learn to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant parameters.
Complicated measurement procedures are not considered to be replicable by
just reading a pertinent paper. Because of lack of space, in published papers
essential details about the procedures are being left out; sometimes the
researcher intentionally gives a global description to defend him- or herseif
against premature and incompetent replication, or to prevent colleagues
from producing new facts before he or she finds time to "discover" them.
Researchers who want to apply the procedure are urged to contact their
colleague for further Information, and maybe even for training through
which unreported presuppositions and details are being transferred. Until
such enculturation has taken place, a researcher who cannot replicate a
certain result may expect to be accused of being not competent enough to
carry out the experiment (Travis, 1981).
In the case of attachment theory, the same enculturation process appears
to exist for procedures like the Strange Situation (Ainsworth et al., 1978), and
the Adult Attachment Interview (Main & Goldwyn, in press). A training of
several weeks in one of the American research centers is considered neces-
sary for the reliable and valid coding of the observations or Interviews, and
therefore for a plausible and persuasive contribution to the international
discourse on attachment. When central theses of attachment theory are in
danger of being falsified by "untrained" researchers, this "incompetence" and
lack of enculturation will be explicitly used against the "dissident" (see, for an
example, Waters, 1983). On the one hand, such arguments appear to belong
to the category of ad hominem arguments (Fogelin, 1987), that should be
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fcrbidden in rational scientific discourse; on the other hand, however, some
measurement procedures can be so complicated that an intensive training
indeed is necessary to get insight into essential elements, to be able not only
to code the material reliably, but also in agreement with the investigators
who constructed the procedure. Sometimes it is hard to know which proce-
dural variations indeed are relevant and which are irrelevant, unless the
"novice" is being instructed in personal training sessions with the construc-
tors. Background knowledge cannot always be made explicit äs Popper
(1980) assumed. We should leave room for "tacit knowledge" (Polyani, 1973)
that can be crucial for the adequate application of complicated measures, not
only in the domain of the natural sciences but also in that of the behavioral
sciences.
Accepting that background knowledge always remains fallible, and partly
implicit, and that, therefore, the application of measurement procedures is
subject to an enculturation process the effectiveness of which can be doubted,
the possibility of a so-called "experimenter regression" has to be considered.
This paradox means that replication logically can not be the ultimate lest of a
statement's truth. Replication is a matter of trained application of measure-
ment procedures that cannot be described algorithmically. Therefore, the
application of the procedures always can be criticized, and, in fact, a further
test would be necessary to see whether the quality of the replication meets
the accepted Standards or not. But this test would also be based on a
complicated measurement procedure, and would therefore again be subject
to criticism. The "experimenter" regression could be stopped if the final
decision about the adequateness of a measure's application would be taken by
the investigator who constructed the measure. Such a short circuit, however,
would imply methodological solipsism: Every researcher would in the end
have the right to decide about the truth value of his or her own propositions.
Constructivists, however, locate the decision on a social level: The scientific
forum—or at least its most powerful pari—is supposed to finally decide about
the validity of the replication. Collins (1985) and Travis (1981) describe this
process of consensus construction äs a rhetorical discourse resulting in a
paradigm shift or continuation (Kühn, 1962). Replications are social construc-
tions; they are the final product of a discourse on whai is considered adequate
and relevant in a certain domain of research.
THE PARADOX OF REPLICATION AS NEGOTIATION
The constructivistic argumentation for replications äs the result of negotia-
tions is elegant. According to constructivists, participant observation studies
in different domains of natural science have shown that replications can
seldom be carried out algorithmically, and that replication results are consid-
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ered "true" only after intensive debate about relevant parameters. This view
on replication appears to demystify the idea of exact replications in the
natural sciences, and in this respect seems to close the gap between the social
and the natural sciences. If we apply the constructivistic sociology of science
on its own methods and results, however, a paradox seems to be implied
(Mulkay, 1984). Through several replications it was established that replica-
tion studies constitute contingent social constructions, and can never be
considered äs unproblematic validations of knowledge Claims. The same
holds true for constructivistic replication studies: In these cases, too, rhetorics
are being used to make clear that several different replications did only differ
in irrelevant aspects, and, therefore, should be seen äs real replications.
Metastudies should not be exempted from the constructivistic Interpretation
of replication. And if every researcher—or better still, every forum of re-
searchers—would construe his or its own Interpretation of reality and, there-
fore, his or its own idea of replication, why should we take the constructivistic
view more seriously than the view of the researchers in the field?
Although constructivism criticized the concept of exact replication, and
showed the relativity of replication outcome, this theory of science did not
succeed in rejecting replication äs a regulatory criterion for science. Replica-
tions can always be heavily discussed because of changing parameters ex-
plaining divergent results, but replication studies remain a very strong motive
for the spiral of ever more detailed discussions about knowledge Claims, and
the studies that constitute their foundation. For example, the constructivist
Collins (1985) still concludes that "Replicability ... is the Supreme Court of
the scientific System." The simplistic view on replication äs the ultimate
criterion for the validity of the original study, however, should be replaced by
the idea that all results of scientific research, and, therefore, also the replica-
tion results, can only get their impact on scientific developments through the
medium of discourse. Replications may lead to refinements of original results,
or to their rejection, but only äs a result of debates in the scientific forum. A
study that fails to replicate the original results, or that succeeds in replicating
them, cannot determine the outcome of the scientific discourse. The possi-
bility of replication, however, appears to be a condition sine qua non if a study
is to be taken seriously in the discourse. That is, every research project should
in principle be replicable; if this is not the case, the study should not be taken
into account by the forum (Popper, 1980). Whether a study will in fact be
replicated is a different question. Only if a series of varied replications does
not succeed in producing new "facts," researchers feel urged to replicate the
original äs exactly äs possible. And in that case, it would still be difficult to
know whether an exact replication is being carried out: Replications never
completely succeed in controlling all potentially relevant patameters (for
example, spatiotemporal parameters). Therefore, the exactness of the repli-
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cation is the result of competent researchers discussing the replication against
the background of available knowledge in the field.
A PROCESS MODEL FOR REPLICATION
Replications can be classified in several different ways. Lykken (1968) for
example introduced the concepts of "literal replication," "operational repli-
cation," and "constructive replication," and they constitute a continuum
along which ever more parameters are being varied. La Sorte (1972) devel-
oped a somewhat more extensive classification that also includes research on
the validity of measures and longitudinal research (repeated measurements).
Bahr et al. (1983) present the most systematic and complete classification.
They differentiate four important parameters that may vary in replication
studies—time, place, method, and sample—and they show that combinations
of these parameters result in 16 different kinds of replication. These types of
replication can be placed on a continuum from constant parameters (the
exact replication) to completely different parameters. They found that about
27% of 300 replications could be classified in the category: constant sample
and method, but different time and place. About 21% could be classified äs
keeping the sample characteristics constant, and changing all the other
parameters. These two types of replication, therefore, include about half of
the replication studies.
Such classifications do not take into account two important types of repli-
cation—that is, secondary analysis and meta-analysis. Secondary analysis is a
kind of replication in which all parameters except the researcher and the
method of data analysis are kept constant. Secondary analysis Starts with the
data äs collected in a certain way in a certain sample. The replication of Burt's
studies by Kamin (1974) in fact can be considered a secondary analysis, in
which only Burt's statistics were tested against probability. If such a sec-
ondary analysis is carried out with minimal methodical and theoretical
variations, and nevertheless leads to divergent results, it can be considered
one of the most powerful falsifications through replication. Secondary anal-
ysis also is one of the most inexpensive and efficient types of replication,
because it is based on existing data sets. One of the main barriers to secondary
replication is, however, the accessibility of the original data sets. Wolins
(1962) reported that 24% of 37 authors were willing to make their data sets
available. Twenty-one researchers claimed that their data sets were lost.
Craig and Reesen (1973) found that 38% of 53 researchers were unwilling to
make their raw data available for secondary analysis (see also Miedema,
1986).
The results of the secondary analyses are sometimes rather disappointing.
1
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Results do not always appear to be replicable, because the first researcher
used other methods that now sometimes seem outdated (Bryant & Wortman,
1978). We would like to state, therefore, that secondary analysis should have
the Status of an intermediate type of research situated between the original
study and its actual replication. If secondary analysis of the existing data set
already leads to falsification of the results, further replication including data
collection should be considered an intolerable waste of time and money (see
Figure 3.1).
Secondary analysis can be subclassified in two categories. First, secondary
analysis may include recoding of the original raw data. Stevenson et al.
(1973), for example, did recode part of the Efron's material on media reports
of a presidential campaign. We propose to call this type of replication the
"complete secondary analysis," because two phases of processing the raw
data are involved: the coding and analyzing of the data. In many studies in the
behavioral scierices data are recorded on video- or audiotape; such raw data
always can be used for a complete secondary analysis, at least during the time
that the recordings still have a reasonable quality. Second, secondary analysis
may be restricted to coded data; in this case, we propose to use the concept of
"restricted secondary analysis." In this type of secondary analysis the coding
System is not changed but only the methods of analyzing the data, to see
whether the original results survive statistical criticism or the application of
refined methods of statistical analysis (see, for example, Cronbach & Webb's
[1975] unsuccessful reanalysis of a classical Aptitude-Treatment Interaction
study).
If the restricted or complete type of secondary analysis shows convergent
results, replications should be carried out in which new data under different
conditions are being collected (see Figure 3.1). From the Start, the original
study will be "trusted" so much that rather significant variations in the design
will be applied. Larger variations may lead to more interesting discoveries in
addition to the original study, but they will be followed by smaller variations
if more global replications fail to produce new "facts." This process of varied
replications seems to be inherent to modern science, and to be especially
characteristic for the phase of "normal" science (Kühn, 1962). This type of
replication is not algorithmically carried out, but it is tried, on the contrary, to
determine the robustness of the original results for spatiotemporal and other
variations, and possibly to refine the original results with additional hypoth-
eses. If even modest variations fail to reproduce the results, a more or less
exact replication is needed (see Figure 3.1).
We consider meta-analyses to be replications because these analyses test
the replicability of the original study in a series of varied replications. Until
recently, the Integration of the results of a great number of empirical studies
on a certain domain seemed exclusively to be a matter of qualitative analysis
in which the reviewer structures his material intuitively, and reaches a global
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conclusion. In the last decade a trend toward formalizing this qualitative
process by means of meta-analyses can be observed (Glass, McGaw, & Smith,
1981; Chapter 6). Through meta-analysis a combined effect size for different
studies may be computed that gives a more precise and replicable description
of the outcome of a series of related studies (Rosenthal, 1991). Furthermore, a
meta-analysis can trace the effects of systematic variations in design on the
outcome of a series of studies, thereby locating the spatiotemporal bound-
aries of replicability.
In attachment theory, for example, several instructive examples of such
meta-analyses can be found. Goldsmith and Alansky (1987) showed through
meta-analysis that the average effect size for the relation between maternal
responsiveness and infants' attachment classification appeared to be much
smaller in a series of replications (with more or less strong variations in
methods and samples) than Ainsworth and her colleagues (1978) had found in
their original study. Although this meta-analysis was based on studies that
were very divergent in quality of design and Instrument, its outcome should
be taken into account äs a warning not to foreclose the discussion about the
central theme of attachment and responsiveness. Van Uzendoorn and Kroo-
nenberg (1988) were able to show through meta-analysis that cross-cultural
differences of attachment classification distributions were smaller than the
intracultural differences. Before this meta-analysis it was assumed that distri-
butions were culture-specific, just on the basis of a few samples from Ger-
many, Japan, and Israel. McCartney and Phillips (1988) showed that the
average effect size for the relation between type of care (day care or "home-
care") and quality of attachment, specifically avoidance to the caregiver, was
very small, although a few isolated studies seemed to have proven a negative
effect of day care on attachment. The authors also fruitfully used the varia-
tions in replication studies to analyze their influence on the relation between
type of care and attachment. They showed that neither sex of experimenter
nor sex and age of infant were related to the effect size, but that it did matter
whether the coders were blind to the infants' membership of type of care. If
the coders were not blind to group membership, effect sizes were relatively
higher and pointed toward a negative influence of day care on attachment
quality (McCartney & Phillips, 1988, p. 167). In this way, varied replications
can be combined to get insight into the overall effect size äs well äs into the
influences of the variations on the relations studied.
As is shown by Lytton (Chapter 6), however, meta-analyses require many
decisions to be taken in several different parts of the study. These decisions
may or may not be made explicit, and other meta-analysts may or may not
reach the same conclusions based upon the same "raw data" but departing
from different presuppositions and decision rules. For example, in a meta-
analysis on parental punishment strategies the exact definition of this con-
struct should be given, and the researcher should decide what measures are
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considered to be valid operationalizations of this construct. Different meta-
analysts may propose different definitions and measures, and therefore select
different (sub-)samples of pertinent studies, yielding different effect sizes
(Chapter 6). Therefore, meta-analyses should also be replicated, and through
variations in decision rules, it should be tested how robust meta-analytic
outcomes in fact are. Only after intensive discourse on implicit and explicit
decision rules—against the background of available knowledge (temporarily)
considered true—the scientific forum may decide on one or the other out-
come, and consider this result äs (provisional) part of true background
knowledge (see Figure 3.1).
CONCLUSIONS
Although many researchers and philosophers of science think that replica-
tions represent an important cornerstone of science, much confusion exists äs
to what we should consider replication studies to be, and what kinds of
replication efforts can be distinguished. In this chapter, we tried to show that
replications should not be narrowed down to the rather small category of
exact or algorithmic replications. Usually replications consist of variations
upon the theme of the original study, and the scientific discourse focuses upon
the question in what sense it may theoretically be supposed that varied
primary analysis
secondary analysis
complete/restricted
varied replications
exact replications
meta-analysis
replications of
meta-analysis
Figure 3.1. A process model of different types of replications.
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replications produce results converging with those of the original study. In a
broader Interpretation of replication, we should not only consider the partial
or complete repetition of the original study through secondary analysis or
through collecting new data äs "real" replication, but also meta-analysis of a
series of related studies. Through meta-analysis it can be tested what varia-
tions in relevant parameters influence the results, and whether the outcome
of the original study indeed can be considered to be replicated—not in an
isolated replication study, but in a series of varied replications. In our process
model of replication, the relations between the different kinds of replication
studies have been shown, and the discursive context of replications has been
emphasized. Replicability is a necessary condition for every study that is
intended to have an impact on the scientific discourse, but an exact replica-
tion is only a boundary case indicating that varied replications did not yield
fruitful discussions about the theory to which the original study contributed.
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